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Like many other philosophers writing today, Paul Moser believes 
that God’s existence is hidden, at least for some people at some times, 
meaning that God’s existence “fails to be not only obvious but also 
beyond cognitively reasonable doubt” (p. 1). In this book, Moser presents 
an original approach to divine hiddenness and explores the implications 
of this approach for religious epistemology. He argues not only that 
hiddenness fails to rationally support a skeptical attitude to divine reality 
but also that a proper understanding of divine purposes in self-revelation 
should lead us to expect hiddenness. Th e book’s central thesis is that we 
should expect conclusive evidence of God’s existence to be purposively 
available – that is, available in a way that “accommodates the distinctive 
purposes of a perfectly loving God.” Such purposes, says Moser, “would 
aim noncoercively but authoritatively to transform human purposes to 
agree with divine purposes, despite human resistance of various and 
sundry sorts” (p. 2).  On Moser’s account, then, God is hidden from some 
people at some times because such people, through their unwillingness 
to be transformed by God, are not well-positioned to receive (or respond 
to) purposively available evidence of divine reality. According to Moser, 
the book marks “a Copernican Revolution in cognitive matters about 
God’s existence” (p. 4), necessitating what he calls a seismic shift  in the 
epistemology of religious belief. At the heart of this shift  is the importance 
placed on the human will, over and above the human intellect, in receiving 
and responding to conclusive evidence of divine reality.  Th e aim in what 
follows is to provide a brief summary of the book’s contents, and then to 
try and anticipate some of the concerns that some readers may have.
In chapter one, Moser makes an important distinction between what 
he terms ‘spectator evidence’ and ‘perfectly authoritative evidence’.  Th e 
former is “evidence pointing to some truth but not demanding that its 
recipients yield their wills to (the will of) the source of the evidence” 
(p. 46). Th e latter is evidence which does make such a demand. Moser 
argues that a perfectly loving God who is interested in establishing 
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genuinely redemptive relationships with human beings would forego 
spectator evidence of God’s existence (which, even if conclusive, would 
be merely academic and would fail to challenge us in the relevant and 
appropriate way(s)). Instead, such a God would reveal himself purposively 
and authoritatively (so as to challenge our wills), in a manner that is 
“akin to evidence from conscience” (p. 62). Th e absence of a person’s 
experience of this evidence in no way makes skepticism normative 
for others, says Moser, since it may be that this absence is due to the 
person’s unwillingness to receive such purposively available authoritative 
evidence (hereaft er PAAE).  
Chapter two develops in more detail the notion of PAAE and explores 
the reasons for which a perfectly loving God might choose to remain 
hidden (at least from some people at some times). A non-exhaustive list 
of these reasons, Moser suggests, includes: “(a) to teach people to yearn 
for . . . personal fellowship with God, (b) to strengthen grateful trust in 
God . . . , (c) to remove human complacency toward God . . . , (d) to shatter 
destructively prideful human self-reliance, and (e) to prevent people 
who aren’t ready for fellowship with God from explicitly rejecting God” 
(p. 107). Th e third chapter explores God’s invitation to set aside our 
selfi shness and be willingly transformed so that we love others (even 
enemies) in a way that more closely approximates the divine unselfi sh 
love for us exemplifi ed so powerfully in Jesus.  Of particular interest 
in this chapter is Moser’s discussion of the underlying epistemology of 
his account of our knowing God on the basis of PAAE. Moser argues 
that “God’s intervening Spirit . . . witnesses to, and thus confi rms, God’s 
reality directly for willingly receptive people at God’s chosen time” and 
that this “yields fi rsthand foundational (that is, noninferential) evidence 
and knowledge of God’s reality” (p. 150). Interestingly, readers may 
think at this point that Moser is off ering us Reformed Epistemology for 
evidentialists (with the concept of evidence broadened to include PAAE). 
Th is characterization seems accurate enough.  Moser seems to agree with 
reformed epistemologists that belief in God can be ‘properly basic’; the 
main diff erence is that Moser wants to characterize his view as evidentialist. 
What is truly surprising is that Moser mentions “reformed epistemology” 
(and Plantinga) in only one paragraph, in the fi nal chapter.
Chapter four discusses the revolutionary changes that would take place 
in philosophy if more philosophers prepared themselves to receive PAAE 
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and let it transform their lives, in general, and their intellectual pursuits, 
in particular.  “[P]hilosophers,” says Moser, “should actually participate 
eagerly in the church community of God’s people, as philosophical 
servants rather than self-avowed intellectual superiors, to identify its 
philosophical needs for the sake of the Good News and then to serve 
those needs in redemptive love” (p. 232). Th e last chapter expands on 
how the epistemological shift  argued for in the previous chapters (i.e. the 
shift  from spectator evidence to PAAE) is benefi cial to all humans, since 
it puts us in a better position to address two of our most fundamental 
problems: destructive selfi shness and impending death. An appendix to 
the book attempts to dispel any remaining skeptical worries.  
Th e Elusive God is an interesting, insightful, and at times highly 
polemical work which provides an original theistic voice in the ongoing 
conversation about divine hiddenness. Moser’s defense of the claim that 
cognitive issues related to God’s existence are signifi cantly aff ected by 
whether we humans are willing to be “transformed toward God’s moral 
character of perfect love . . ., thereby obediently yielding our wills to 
God’s authoritative will” (p. 119) represents the book’s most important 
contribution to contemporary religious epistemology.  However, 
controversy will likely surround the notion that this contribution amounts 
to (or necessitates) a “Copernican Revolution in cognitive matters about 
God’s existence,” for reasons that we’ll see below.  
Moser thinks that an epistemology of PAAE is the only game in 
town once the relevant aims of a perfectly loving God (including the 
aim of challenging humans to yield their wills to divine purposes) are 
fully appreciated and accounted for. He launches critiques against other 
purportedly viable contenders such as fi deism, natural theology, and a 
religious epistemology centering on ‘numinous’ or mystical experiences 
(Plantinga’s reformed epistemology is conspicuously absent from the 
list). Moser argues that fi deism is an epistemological non-starter, since 
it “implausibly entails that theistic commitment need not rest for its 
cognitive status on supporting evidence,” thus making theism “evidentially 
arbitrary and thus cognitively irrational” (p. 33, italics omitted). 
Mystical or numinous religious experiences are, says Moser, “not only 
unnecessary but also dangerous for experientially well-founded theistic 
belief,” since they divert attention from what would be the main aim of 
God in giving us self-revelation – namely, “the purportedly redemptive 
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manifestation of a divine authoritatively loving character worthy of 
worship and thus of obedient human submission” (p. 8). Moser’s aversion 
to this kind of epistemology of religious experience is linked to his 
distaste for the evidences of natural theology in that he fi nds both to be 
spectacular, disinterested, and even academic or trivial with respect to 
the transformative challenge God makes upon our wills. Moser faults 
traditional natural theology (with its focus on cosmological, teleological, 
and other arguments for God’s existence) and much recent work in the 
philosophy of religion for having “simply neglected [PAAE] for the sake 
of more comfortable, less challenging spectator evidence” (p. 53).  
For Moser to make good on his advertisement of the book’s 
“Copernican Revolution,” he needs to defend two important claims:  
(1) A perfectly loving God would off er only PAAE to accomplish 
God’s aims in self-revelation
and 
(2) Other, rival religious epistemologies off er at best only spectator 
evidence  
But readers may fi nd ambiguity in Moser’s position with respect to 
whether he wants to defend (1) or: 
(1*) A perfectly loving God would off er primarily PAAE to accomplish 
God’s aims in self-revelation.  
(1*) may be the easier of the two to defend but would, of course, 
somewhat weaken Moser’s position (since defenders of rival religious 
epistemologies could agree with (1*)). In any case, many readers familiar 
with the Jewish and Christian religious traditions will note that there is 
warrant (in both Scripture and theology) for thinking that God employs 
many resources – particularly the natural order – in self-revelation. Now 
Moser briefl y discusses St. Paul’s remarks to this eff ect in Romans 1:19-
20, and says (p. 48) that the evidence mentioned in this passage yields 
only ‘casual knowledge’ that God exists (which would not be adequate 
to bring people to reconciliation with God).  But many readers might 
fi nd Moser’s remarks here puzzling. For, this looks like an admission that 
God’s existence may not be ‘hidden’ aft er all, whereas the main aim of 
the book is to off er an account of PAAE to explain why God is hidden (at 
least from some people at some times).  
Concerning natural theology, Moser complains that “endless disputes 
about probabilities involving apparent design in biology or cosmology or 
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about the need for an inaugural cause behind any parade of contingent 
causes and eff ects” are “esoteric” and have “nothing directly at all to do 
with God’s inherent character of perfect authoritative love” (p. 136). 
He goes on to suggest that these arguments don’t convince anyone not 
already committed to certain theistic presuppositions. But of course, 
many philosophers won’t see the presence of intractable disagreement 
about an argument as an index of its evidential strength. Moreover, what 
is good for the goose is good for the gander. Moser cites selfi sh attitudes 
and willful resistance to setting aside one’s autonomy as reasons for why 
people do not receive (or if they receive, do not respond favorably to) 
PAAE.  But for all we know, these same considerations explain why some 
people are not convinced by the arguments of natural theology.  
Moser’s contention in (2), above (that rival religious epistemologies 
off er, at best, only spectator evidence), is far from obvious. For example, 
suppose someone (call him Bob) carefully considers anthropic, big-bang 
cosmological, and fi ne-tuning arguments which point to the universe 
having been delicately designed so as to support the eventual appearance 
of human life (the latter being either a special act of creation or the 
intended outcome of an evolutionary process whose requisite initial 
conditions were put in place by the designer).  William Lane Craig and 
others have argued that such arguments pack with them evidence that the 
designer is a personal Agent.  Now suppose Bob fi nds himself convinced 
in this way that a very powerful, very knowledgeable, and personal 
Agent intended his (and other humans’) existence. Th is evidence may 
well suggest to Bob questions such as whether there are more specifi c 
purposes that this Agent has concerning him, and whether this Agent 
has revealed himself in any other, more specifi c way.  In considering such 
questions, Bob may already be yielding (or at least beginning to yield) 
his will to his Creator. (Incidentally, something similar to this scenario 
is empirically confi rmed in the faith journeys of many noted thinkers). 
So it is not clear that natural theology, for example, amounts to no more 
than spectator evidence. Readers might also wonder (a) why a numinous 
experience couldn’t have as its object a demanding, authoritative God 
(and thus involve PAAE), and (b) why Moser, in claiming that only 
his religious epistemology accounts for PAAE, seems to ignore all of 
Plantinga’s work on the role of the will in religious belief formation (see 
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Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000), 
especially chapter seven).  
It should be briefl y pointed out that in chapter 3, Moser argues for 
what he calls the ‘divine manifest-off ering approach to atonement’ while 
launching an in-house critique against “some of the Christian tradition” 
concerning the historically popular ‘penal substitution’ theory (which 
claims that God punished the sinless Jesus in place of sinful humanity 
– a claim Moser fi nds “morally distorted” (p. 174)). Whatever readers 
may think about the success or failure of this polemic, it is not germane 
to the main argument of the book, since Moser’s account of PAAE seems 
consistent with both the manifest-off ering and the penal substitution 
approaches to atonement.  
Finally, with all due apologies to Moser, the book is incredibly verbose. 
In the 278 pages of text, the reader will be struck with the realization 
that some of the same phrases keep popping up over and over again, as 
do some of the same claims (oft en without additional argumentation). 
All things considered, it seems reasonable to suppose that the book 
could have been condensed to around 150 pages. For readers familiar 
with Moser’s previous, crisply argued work, this will seem an odd 
stylistic development. Th at said, the essential points Moser presents in 
Th e Elusive God make an important contribution to the epistemology 
of religious belief and should be taken seriously by present and future 
epistemologists and philosophers of religion.
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